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CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the High Court's decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2),1 some 
commentators have argued that, at common law, recognition of Aboriginal 
land rights entails recognition of other aspects of Aboriginal customary 
law? Indeed, although there have been a number of post-Mabo decisions 
refusing to extend recognition of Aboriginal law, on the basis of the Mabo 
principle, beyond rights and interests in land,3 there is also judicial support 
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1(1992) 175 CLR 1 ('Mabo'). 
2 See, for example, A Lokan, 'From Recognition to Reconciliation: The Functions 
of Aboriginal Rights Law' (1999) 23(1) Melbourne University Law Review 65, 
92-3; RD Lumb, 'The Mabo Case - Public Law Aspects' in MA Stephenson and 
S Ratnapala (eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution - The Aboriginal Land Rights 
Decision and Its Impact on Australian Law (1993), 21-2; KE Mulqueeny, 'Folk-
law or Folklaw: When a Law is Not a Law. Or Is It?' in MA Stephenson and 
S Ratnapala (eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution - The Aboriginal Land Rights 
Decision and Its Impact on Australian Law (1993), 166; G Simpson, 'Mabo, 
International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of Settlement: An Unresolved 
Jurisprudence' (1993) Melbourne University Law Review 195, 208-9 (from an 
international law perspective on aboriginal land rights and aboriginal customary 
law). 
3 For example, in Walker v New South Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45, Sir Anthony 
Mason, the former Chief Justice of the High Court who had been part of the 
effective majority in Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, rejected (at 49) a claim that 
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for such an extension: the decision of Mr Gillies SM in Colin James 
Goodsell v James Galarrwuy Yunupingu4 falling within the latter category. 
Aboriginal customary entitlements beyond those relating to land - for 
example, customs and practices relating to marriage, custody of children 
and crime and punishment - are undoubtedly as important as land rights 
from the perspective of the preservation of Aboriginal cultural identity. 
Nevertheless, the recent Queensland Court of Appeal's decision in Jones v 
Public Trustee of Queensland5 shows that the independent recognition of 
Aboriginal customary rights to land in Mabo is in no sense arbitrary: the 
Court observing that the appellant's non-land Aboriginal customary law 
submission 'appears to be based on a misconception of what was decided 
by the High Court in [Mabo].,6 
Aboriginal law could be brought into account in any substantive way in 
determining the application of European-based criminal law to Aborigines. For a 
decision which did not concern a criminal prosecution, but in which the remarks 
of Mason CJ were applied, see Tun'bal People v Queensland [2002] FCA 1082 
(Spender J). 
4 (1999) 4(2) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 29 (Darwin Magistrates Court, 
Mr Gillies SM, 20 February 1998). In this case, Mr Yunupingu, a Yolngu elder 
and former Australian of the Year, was found not guilty of assault, damage to 
property and theft arising out of an incident in which a non-Aboriginal 
photographer had, without permission, taken photographs of Mr Yunupingu's 
extended family in breach of Yolngu law. The not guilty verdict was based, inter 
alia, on the finding that since Mr Yunupingu' s actions were sanctioned by Yolnga 
law, they were 'done, made or caused in the exercise of a right recognised at law' 
and therefore authorised under s 26(l)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1997 (NT). For 
present purposes, the crucial part of the explanation of the reason for recognising 
the rights ofMr Yunupingu to enforce Yolngu law on Yolngu land was expressed 
by Gillies SM (at 37) in the following terms: 
1. The source of the enforceability of native title ... is and is only 'as an applicable 
law or statute provides' .... Kirby J in Wik Peoples v Queensland ... 
2. Native title can be described as 'the possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of 
land by native people who have, for want of a better expression, a connection with the 
land': that is, a spiritual or religious relationship to the land. 
3. The use of land includes the enforcement of laws on that native land applicable to 
and accepted by the natives on that land who have a connection with that land; that is, 
the people who are part of the land. (emphasis in original) 
For further discussion, see S Gray, 'An Honest Claim of Right' (1998) 23(2) 
Alternative Law Journal 97; S Gray, 'One Country, Many Laws: Towards 
Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law in the Northern Territory of Australia' 
(1999) LA WASIA Journal 65. 
5 [2004] QCA 269 (6 August 2004). 
6 Ibid [14], citing Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
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I The Facts 
The question raised by this appeal was whether a claimed right, based 
upon traditional Aboriginal law or custom, to represent beneficiaries of a 
deceased estate, without their knowledge, in an action against the personal 
representative could be recognised. The appellant, John Dalungdalee 
Jones, claimed such a right as senior elder of the Dalungdalee people of 
Fraser Island in relation to the intestate estate of Mr Bennett, a member of 
the Dalungdalee people. 
The late Mr Bennett became the Australian bantam-weight boxing 
champion in 1948 and, during the course of his career, won considerable 
money. Because he was an Aboriginal, Mr Bennett's earnings were 
controlled by a public officer7 authorised to manage the propelty of 
Aboriginal persons. Mr Bennett died intestate on 10 December 1981 and, 
as a result of his investigations of Mr Bennett's affairs, the appellant 
formed the opinion that not all the money received on behalf of Mr 
Bennett had been accounted for: the amount unaccounted for estimated to 
be worth many millions of dollars according to current appreciated values. 
As an aspect of his duty as senior elder, therefore, the appellant instituted 
proceedings in the Supreme Court on 11 March 2003. His claim was made 
under the Succession Act 1981 (Qld)8 and the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 1999 (Qld).9 
On 9 February 2004, White J refused the appellant's application to set the 
matter down for trial; her Honour making the order, inter alia, that '[o]ne 
or more of the intestacy beneficiaries of the estate of Mr ... Bennett be 
substituted as Plaintiff or Plaintiffs to this proceeding' .10 It is against White 
J's decision that the appellant appealed. On 7 April 2004, the three 
surviving intestacy beneficiaries were substituted as plaintiffs in the 
proceeding and each of them swore that they did not wish to be 
represented by the appellant. 
7 Originally known as the Director of Native Affairs and appointed under the 
Aboriginals Preservation and Protection Acts 1939-1946. Under a later Act of 
1965, this public officer became known as the Director of Aboriginal and Island 
Affairs: see Jones v Public Trustee of Queensland [IJ. 
8 Section 52(2). 
9 Rule 643(1), see also r 75(1). 
10 Jones v Public Trustee of Queensland [5]. 
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II THE QUEENSLAND COURT OF ApPEAL'S DECISION 
The Court unanimously concluded that the appeal should be dismissed. l ! 
In doing so, they found that there were two reasons why Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rule 75(1), providing for proceedings by the appellant in 
representative form, was not available or appropriate. First, the appellant 
did not share with the surviving intestacy beneficiaries the same interest 
needed to satisfy the terms of the rule: all three intestacy beneficiaries 
being children of the deceased and, therefore, invested by the Succession 
Act with the sole right as next of kin to share in what remained of their 
father's intestate estate. 12 Secondly, and for the Court more compelling, 
the intestacy beneficiaries had been joined as individual named plaintiffs 
and sought to be substituted as the appellants in the appeal, which they did 
not wish to prosecute.1 3 
More importantly for present purposes, the Court also considered the 
appellant's submission that White J's decision was incorrect because it 
failed to take account of Aboriginal traditional or customary law on the 
subject: that is, in the interpretation of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
and the appeal, the appellant's customary law duty and right to represent 
members of his people prevailed. The appellant advanced two reasons to 
support this submission: the provisions of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)14 
and s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).15 
Although noting that the same conclusion prevailed if the question were 
determined under the NTA or the RDA,16 the COUlt held that the appellant's 
11 McPherson, Williams and Jerrad JJA. 
12 See Jones v Public Trustee a/Queensland [11]. 
13 Ibid. Although the intestacy beneficiaries had, on 23 June 2003, entered into a 
deed with the appellant by which they agreed to assign to the appellant a "'one 
sixth share ... of the estate, right, title, benefit and interest to which each of the 
beneficiaries is or may be entitled in and to the real and personal estate of the 
deceased in intestacy together with all income arising there [from] from the date 
of death'" [at 6], the Court expressly stated that this deed did not purport to confer 
on the appellant an 'enduring power to act for them, nor anything in the nature of 
a power of attorney coupled with an interest that would or might be irrevocable' 
[at 11]. Thus, even if the intestacy beneficiaries had previously agreed to being 
represented by the appellant, they were 'not bound by that decision and were free 
to revoke their consent or instructions to him' [at 11]. 
14 Hereafter referred to as 'NTA'. See Jones v Public Trustee 0/ Queensland [12]. 
15 Hereafter referred to as 'RDA'. See Jones v Public Trustee a/Queensland [12]. 
16 That is, the Court observed that since s 211 of the NTA is expressed to apply 
only to native title rights and interests 'in relation to land or waters' and s 223(1) 
of the NTA defines 'native title' and 'native title rights and interests' as 
'communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples ... in 
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submission based on Aboriginal customary law failed on the ground that 
there was '[no] evidence of the alleged traditional or customary law relied 
on or its precise content,.17 That is, the submission did not satisfy the 
fourth prerequisite for recognising a traditional law or custom identified by 
Kirby P in Mason v Tritton: 1S namely, 'that the right claimed is sought to 
be relied on in the exercise of traditional Aboriginal laws and customs' .19 
In this context, McPherson JA observed that: 
Apart altogether from the other three requirements, [the appellant's] claim 
fails at this hurdle. There is no evidence that among the Dalungdalee people 
of Fraser Island there was or is a continuing custom that the eldest member is 
entitled to insist on representing individuals, whether in or out of litigation, 
without their consent and in spite of their expressed wish that he should not 
do so; and no evidence that the intestacy beneficiaries are here seeking to 
exercise any such right. 20 
Although this ground alone was sufficient to dismiss the appellant's 
submission based on Aboriginal customary law, the Court offered two 
further reasons, by way of obiter, for rejecting the Aboriginal customary 
law submission. Crucially, both these reasons were based upon the High 
Court's decision in Maho. First, it was suggested that even if there were 
evidence that the appellant had a customary law duty and right to represent 
members of his people which extended to proceedings in a court of law, it 
was not established that: 
in consequence the intestacy beneficiaries lack or are deprived of authority to 
decide for themselves whether it will be he or someone else who will act on 
their behalf in this proceeding. To find that Aboriginal customary law denies 
relation to land or waters', the appellant's submission failed because '[t]here is 
nothing ... to link with land or water the traditional right or duty asserted by [the 
appellant] of representing members of the Dalungdalee people, or that constitutes 
a "connection" with any land or water': Jones v Public Trustee of Queensland 
[16]. 
In the context of considering whether any of the relevant provisions of the 
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) were invalidated by the RDA, the Court noted that: 
In the application of its provisions to a distribution on intestacy, Part 3 of the 
Succession Act makes no distinction between peoples of any race or origin. Its 
provisions apply equally to all people including Aborigines. If there are in fact 
traditional rights to inherit property special to Aboriginal people which Part 3 of the 
Succession Act restricts or with which it interferes, those traditional rights have not 
been established in this case, and s 10(1) of the [RDA] is therefore not shown to be 
attracted to them 
-Jones v Public Trustee of Queensland [19]; see also [17], [18], [20]. 
17 See Jones v Public Trustee of Queensland [13]. 
18 (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 584. 
19 See Jones v Public Trustee of Queensland [13]. 
20 Ibid. 
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them as individuals such a right of choice might well suggest that it is 
unreasonable or inconsistent with the common law, and therefore not capable 
of being recognised under the law of Queensland or Australia: [Mabo] ... 21 
For present purposes, however, the second reason suggested in obiter for 
denying the Aboriginal customary law submission is crucial. McPherson 
J A observed that: 
It may, in any event, be added that it appears to be based on a misconception 
of what was decided by the High Court in [Mabo] .. , What [Mabo] decided 
was ... that the act of state of acquiring territorial sovereignty or 'radical title' 
does not, without more, itself extinguish Aboriginal or native rights or title in 
or to land and waters, which, on the contrary, continue to be recognised by the 
common law until effectively extinguished .... ' The right or duty of [the 
appellant] to represent his people or some of them is not shown to be related 
to customary Aboriginal rights in land or title to waters either at all or in any 
way that is recognised by the common law in Australia ... 22 
Thus, McPherson JA clearly acknowledged that the High Court's 
recognition of native title in Mabo was expressly limited to one particular 
aspect of Aboriginal customary rights: their rights and interests in land and 
waters. 
III CONCLUSION 
The Queensland Court of Appeal's decision in Jones v Public Trustee of 
Queensland has made it clear that, although Aboriginal law or custom can 
be a valid source of legal rights if it satisfies a number of requirements,23 
recognition of Aboriginal customary laws, beyond those relating to land, 
cannot be based upon the Mabo rationale. Indeed, in Mabo, when Brennan 
J, as he then was, observed that the preferable rule, namely, that a 'mere 
change in sovereignty does not extinguish native title to land,'24 'equates 
the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony with the inhabitants of a 
conquered colony in respect of their rights and interests in land,'25 his 
Honour expressly limited his analogy to one particular aspect of the rights 
of the inhabitants of a conquered colony: their rights and interests in land. 
Thus, the Mabo decision only equates the land rights of aboriginal 
inhabitants of a settled colony with the land rights of the inhabitants of a 
conquered colony. This is crucial: by explaining why the non-land rights 
21 Ibid, citing Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
22 Jones v Public Trustee of Queensland [14], citing Mabo (1992) 175 CLR l. 
23 See text accompanying above nn 18-19. 
24 Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 157; See also Maho 54-7,82,183; Western Australia 
v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 422. 
25 Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1,157 (Brennan J, emphasis added). 
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of aboriginal inhabitants in a settled colony remain different from the non-
land rights of the inhabitants of conquered colonies, the distinction 
between 'settled' and 'conquered or ceded' territories is preserved. 
